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Oppenheimer's staff there was concerned with producing such a weapon. More to the idea of an aerial bomb, and after the establishment in the spring of 1943 of the laboratory at Los Alamos, Dr. 2 As research in nuclear fields progressed, this view was modified scientists turned The celebrated physicist referred to the possibility of constructing from uranium a bomb of tremendous power "however," he added, "such bombs might very well prove too heavy for transport by air," apparently contemplating their delivery by ship or use as concealed land mines. Governmental interest in nuclear fission for military purposes was initiated in the United States by a letter, dated 2 August 1939, to President Roosevelt from Dr. In spite of lacunae in the evidence, however, the main outlines of the AAF's role in the two attacks can be told in sufficient detail. The authors have had access to the AAF records in regard to the employment of the bomb, but some of the tactical and technological details are lacking because of the unusual security measures in effect, much that was important was not put in writing, and in respect to the political decision to use the bomb, the authors are limited in the main to such published accounts as have appeared. Air Force of a sort which have never been enforced upon earlier chapters and volumes of this series. 1 In respect to the military side of the atom bomb story, which alone is pertinent here, there are still security regulations outside the control of the U.S. This account will not involve the story of what President Truman called "the battle of the laboratories," a most important and absorbing story but one which has been told before and in which the AAF played only a minor role. It is appropriate, then, to relate here so much of the atom bomb story as pertains to the AAF and to try to evaluate the importance of the attack in helping to force the surrender of Japan. It was not, the scientists said, "just another bomb." But in spite of its horrible power, it was another bomb and it was delivered pretty much as hundreds of thousands of other bombs had been delivered-by a B-29 operating out of the Marianas. So dread were the threats for the future that it became difficult to think of the new weapon as an instrument of the war just ending. The new weapon, whose popular designation as "atom bomb" forestalled any chance of a more scientifically accurate nomenclature, threatened to do that overnight-and, indeed, to destroy civilization if used in large numbers.
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It had taken gunpowder a century to revolutionize war, the airplane a generation. Within the written memory of man there had been no improvement in weapons comparable in degree and suddenness. The extent to which these attacks were responsible for the Japanese surrender is, like any complex historical problem, a question to which no universally acceptable answer can be given, but it is almost literally true that the war ended with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In each case the attack caused tremendous physical damage and great loss of life. Three days later a second bomb, of like nature but somewhat more efficient, was dropped on Nagasaki.
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Then, on 6 August, a B-29 dropped on the city of Hiroshima a single bomb of unprecedented destructiveness. The latter view finally prevailed as the accepted military policy: planning for an invasion of Kyushu ( OLYMPIC, November 1945) and later of Honshu ( CORONET, March 1946) was pushed vigorously, and the decision was taken in June and confirmed in July to mount the first of those assaults. Other leaders, while not discounting the possibility of a sudden collapse, believed that such a cheap victory was not probable, at least within the eighteen months allotted in the planning tables. To some civilian leaders in the United States it seemed that if a proper formula could be worked out, the enemy might be brought to surrender without an invasion of the home islands, and this view was shared by many in the AAF and the Navy who were confident of the persuasive powers of the aerial attack and the blockade. The surrender of Germany on 8 May robbed Japan of her only ally and made available for redeployment in the Pacific vast Allied ground, air, and naval forces the progressive deterioration of Japan's air and sea power left as her only source of strength a large and undefeated army. political and military leaders were searching for means to bring the war to a successful and early ending. DURING the spring and summer of 1945, while the air attack against Japan was steadily mounting in intensity, U.S.